National measures of competition and macroeconomic activity have been used by researchers in recent years to explain performance and risk differentials across banks.
4 a long empirical tradition. Early work adopted the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm to assess whether there was any correlation between industry conditions (embodied in structural measures of competition such as concentration ratios) and bank performance. The results of early investigations contend that in order to earn abnormal profits, small numbers of banks may engage in collusive activities, or exercise independent market power, in order to charge higher prices (lower deposit rates / higher loan rates). Later critiques by the Chicago Revisionist School posit that finding evidence of a positive concentration-profitability relationship does not necessarily infer collusive behaviour as it may simply reflect the relationship between size and efficiency (larger banks gain from scale and other efficiency advantages, and consequently more concentrated markets are inherently more profitable). The extent to which banks are able to earn high profits through collusion or the exercise of market power, or as a consequence of superior efficiency, has never been satisfactorily resolved in the empirical literature (Berger, 1995; Goddard et al., 2001 Goddard et al., , 2007 Degryse and Ongena, 2008; Girardone, 2006, 2009; Tregenna, 2009; Dick and Hannan, 2010) .
More recently, contestable markets theory and its new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) counterpart, emphasize the influence of potential as well as actual competition, and consequently focus on competitive conduct of firms in response to changes in demand and supply conditions. Empirical banking research in this vein has found differences in competitive conditions across banking sectors from the 1980s until the present (Molyneux et al., 1994, Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Goddard and Wilson, 2009) . Another strand of the literature examines the dynamics of bank performance in an attempt to assess the extent to which entry, exit and governance mechanisms are efficient enough to drive banks" profit rates to converge towards the same long-run average value. The lower the level of performance (profits) persistence then the more competitive the industry.
Evidence suggests that entry barriers and regulatory and information constraints retard the extent to which profit rates converge and therefore inhibit competition (Berger et al., 2000; Goddard et al., 2004a, b; Goddard et al., 2010a, b) . because in concentrated banking systems with low levels of competition, the market power of incumbent banks results in higher interest rates for borrowers making it more difficult for them to repay loans. Such high interest rates increase the incentives for borrowers to take on greater risk in search of higher returns. This increases the possibility of the non-repayment of loans and the default risk of bank portfolios making the financial system less stable (Boyd and DeNicolo, 2005) . In addition, large banks are often deemed to be Too-Big, Too-Inter-Connected or Too-Complex-To -Fail and thus they obtain implicit (or explicit) subsidies via government safety nets. This may further increase moral hazard and encourage large banks to take-on excessive risks leading to financial instability (O"Hara and Shaw, 1990; Stern and Feldman, 2004; Brown and Dinc, 2009; Herring and Carmassi, 2010; Beck et al., 2010 and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010) .
Empirical evidence in support of the competition-fragility and competition-stability views is rather mixed. For example, Boyd et al. (2006) and DeNicolo and Loukoianova (2006) find that the risk of bank failure rises in lower in competitive markets, while Jiménez et al. (2010) find that risks decrease with an increase in bank market power. Turk-Ariss (2010) assesses how varying degrees of market power influence bank efficiency and stability in developing banking systems and finds that competition leads to instability. Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) , using aggregated data for EU-25 countries, show that national banking market concentration has a negative impact on the stability of European banking systems. Berger et al. (2009) use a variety of risk and competition measures from banks operating in 23 countries. The results provide limited support to both the 6 competition-fragility and competition-stability views in that market power increases credit risk, but banks with greater market power face lower risks. Zhao et al. (2009 Zhao et al. ( , 2010 assess the extent to which deregulatory measures aimed at promoting competition lead to increased risk-taking in Indian banking. The results suggest that competition encourages increased risk-taking.
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2009) suggest a non-linear relationship between bank competition and stability. They argue that the competition-stability view advocated by Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) does not necessarily hold when loan defaults are imperfectly correlated. Heightened competition may reduce borrower"s probability of default (risk-shifting effect), but it may also reduce the interest payments from performing loans, which serves as a buffer to cover loan losses (margin effect). They find evidence of a U-shaped relationship between competition (measured by the number of banks) and bank stability. In highly concentrated markets the risk-shifting effect dominates and more competition reduces bank risk, while in very competitive markets the margin effect dominates and the increased competition erodes bank"s franchise value and hence increases risks.
All the aforementioned empirical studies that focus on competition and stability issues use national measures of competition and (in some cases) economic activity. Such national measures are likely to be inappropriate for countries where banks have a regional customer focus. Previous evidence has shown significant differences in competition across regional banking markets (Carbó et al., 2007) . While banking organizations have grown in size and geographic scope, there is strong evidence that in certain market segments, such as retail deposits and small business loans, banks operate at a regional level (Cohen and Mazzeo, 2003; Wolken, 1990, 1992; Kwast et al, 1997; Amel and Starr-McCluer, 2002) . Furthermore, the contractual relationship between banks and their customers is also more likely to be observed on a regional than on a national basis (Guiso et al, 2004) . For example, Laderman et al (1991) find that community banks tend to lend to firms and individuals nearby. Yeager (2004) also states that 75-90% of loan customers are from within the local region. This implies that for many banks (that typically focus on retail and small businesses lending) their performance and stability is more likely to be affected by regional competitive and economic conditions. Previous research by Daly et al (2004) suggests that there is a positive and significant link between regional economic conditions and bank risk. Regionally focused banks (due to their limited size and geographic scope) are exposed to the risk of a downturn in regional economic conditions (Yeager, 2004) . The conditions of these banks are also expected to be European banking markets have a long tradition of regional focus with mutual banks (savings and cooperative banks) competing in the same market with their commercial counterparts. As far as we are aware, however, no study has investigated bank competition and stability issues at the regional level. The European case provides a good testing ground to analyze such issues because of the significant differences among regions both in terms of economic development and competitive rivalry in the respective banking markets. In this paper we seek to address this shortfall in the literature by examining the relationship between regional economic conditions and competition and their subsequent impact on bank stability for banks based in 11 European countries over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . The results suggest that a U-shaped relationship exists between regional bank competition and bank stability. This implies that a moderate level of bank competition is required to ensure the minimum level of bank risks, while too much or too little competition may both damage bank stability. Furthermore, regional economic conditions play a significant role in determining the stability of European banks. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the econometric methods and data and 8 Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 provides a conclusion.
Methodology and data
In this section we discuss the empirical model used to investigate the impact of regional bank competition and economic conditions on bank stability. Then we explain our measures of bank stability and regional competition. Discussion of the data and control variables then follows.
Estimable model
The purpose of the estimable model outlined in this section is to capture the effects of region-specific competition and economic conditions on bank stability. We also include a range of bank-specific variables that have been used in previous empirical studies that examine the drivers of bank stability. The model is specified as: 
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We measure bank stability using the Z-index. This measure combines: a measure of bank performance (return on assets, ROA); a measure of bank risk (standard deviation of ROA); and a measure of safety and soundness (bank equity capital to asset ratio). The resultant Z-index reflects the size of the extent to which the bank has a cushion (of bank capital) to absorb losses. Consequently, higher values are indicative of lower risk and greater stability. The Z-index has been used widely in previous empirical literature concerned with the measurement and determinants of the safety and soundness of financial institutions (Iannotta et al, 2007; Garcia-Marco and Robles-Fernandez, 2008; Hesse and Cihak, 2007; Beck et al, 2009 ).
The Z-index is calculated as:
ROA is the bank"s return on assets, E/A represents the equity to total assets ratio and ) (ROA We use the Lerner index as our measure for market competition (Lerner, 1934) . The 5 We also use a 4-year rolling time window to calculate the standard deviation of ROA to arrive at our bank risk measure (Z-index) (see Table 5 for robustness test results).
Lerner index measures the mark-up of price over marginal costs and is therefore an indicator of the degree of market power. It is calculated as:
Where it P is the price of total assets (proxied by the ratio of total revenues to total assets for bank i at time t ), it MC is the marginal cost of bank i at time t . This is derived from a translog cost function as follows: Where Cost represents total bank cost, calculated as total expenses over total assets; Q represents a proxy for bank output or total assets.
W and 3 W represent three input prices of funding, fixed capital and labour, respectively, and are calculated as the ratios of interest expenses to total deposits, other operating and administrative expenses to total assets and personnel expenses to total assets, respectively.
Trend represents yearly fixed effects to capture technical changes in the cost function over time.
Following Turk-Ariss (2010), we scale cost and input prices by 3 W to correct for heteroscedasticity and scale biases. Equation (2) is estimated separately for each country.
Finally marginal costs (MC) are then computed as:
To measure regional bank competition ) ( jt LERNER , weighted average regional Lerner indices are calculated. This is done by weighting individual bank Lerner indices by the share of bank deposits over total deposits at the regional level. 6 While the presence of multi-market banks may reduce deposit yet intensify loan market competition (Park and Pennacchi, 2009), the Lerner index (by measuring the mark-up of price over marginal costs) captures the final effects of all sources of impact and hence is an appropriate local competition measure. 7 In contrast to the US where information on the value of deposits, loans and other assets are available at the regional level this is not the case throughout the European Union. Previous research uses the regional distribution of branch offices as weights to calculate their regional competition measures, presuming that a bank"s percentage of branches in a market also holds the same share of deposits (or loans, or assets). However, these measures are significantly biased if the assumption is violated. This is the case if multi-market banks compete differently with local banks (Cohen and Mazzeo, 2007) . Following the findings of Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2009) (Berger and Udell, 2004; Dell"Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Herring, 1999; Panetta et al., 2009; Rajan, 1994; Ruckes, 2004) . Despite the varying explanations for the pro-cyclicality of bank lending behaviour there is no clear consensus as to how regional economic development impacts on bank stability.
Intuitively, regional economic variables such as GDP growth are likely to have a positive impact on bank stability. However, there is some evidence to suggest that lending mistakes are more likely during boom periods than in recession (Jimenez and Saurina, 2006) . There are two possible reasons to explain this. First, when the economy is growing rapidly, banks become over-optimistic about borrowers" ability to repay and this leads to more liberal credit policies with lower credit standards. This lending behavior tends to ultimately result in a higher level of impaired loans and borrower defaults. Secondly, in boom periods excessive competition that can prevail during an economic upturn may erode margins and encourage managers to seek higher return (and therefore higher risk) business.
Hence, we do not have clear expectations as to the relationship between regional economic conditions and overall bank stability. Consistent with previous (regional) studies, we use two major economic indicators in our analysis -regional real GDP growth (GDPGR) and regional unemployment rate (UNEMPR).
Bank-specific variables
We include a variety of bank-specific variables in our model in line with the previous literature. Cost inefficiency (CI), measured as the cost-to-income ratio, is expected to be negatively related to bank stabilities (see Boyd et al, 2006; Agoraki et al, 2009 ). More inefficient banks are likely to take on greater risk to generate returns to improve performance. Bank lending behavior, captured by the ratio of loans to total assets (LA), is expected to be positively linked to bank risks as credit is one of the riskiest areas of banking business. The greater the bank"s loans exposure the higher is the default risk,
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and hence the lower is the stability.
We also include the natural logarithm of bank total assets (lnTA) to control for bank size effects. This may be positively related to bank stability due to the realization of efficiency benefits via economies of scale. However, managers of larger banks may tend to take-on more risks in expectation of the implicit "Too-Big-To-Fail" and related government safety net subsidies designed to bail out distressed institutions (O"Hara and Shaw, 1990; Stern and Feldman, 2004; Brown and Dinc, 2009; Herring and Carmassi, 2010 and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010) . As such, the relationship between bank size and stability is unclear.
Conventional wisdom suggests that diversification (DIV), measured as non-interest income divided by total revenue, can be positively related to bank stability due to the diversification benefits. However, recent evidence suggests that banks that diversify tend to take-on more overall risk in pursuit of potential economies of scope (Stiroh, 2004; Beck et al, 2009 ).
Estimation approach
Equation (1) Method of Moments (GMM) estimator for such models, known as the difference GMM. The lagged exogenous variables values (levels) constitute legitimate instruments for the first-differenced, lagged dependent variable. However, these lagged variables may provide little information about the first differences (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) .
Building on the work of Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998) developed a system estimator that exploits additional moment conditions on both first-differences and levels, with lagged first-differences of the series employed as instruments in the levels equation. The system GMM estimator reduces potential bias in finite samples as well as asymptotic imprecision associated with the difference estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
The consistency of the system GMM estimator depends both on the assumptions that the error term is not auto-correlated as well as on the validity of the instruments used. Two specification tests are reported. The first is a Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, which examines the validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample analogue of the moment conditions used in the estimation procedure. The second test examines the hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the error term. The presence of first-order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals does not imply that the estimates are inconsistent. However, the presence of second-order autocorrelation implies that the estimates are inconsistent. 8 Equation (1) is estimated, therefore, using the two-step system GMM estimator with Windmeijer-corrected standard errors, including both lagged differences and levels of the explanatory variables as instruments. We measure our exogenous variables, (e.g., competition, regional economy and bank-specific variables) with a one-year lag. This is to mitigate potential endogeneity problems between bank stability, regional economic conditions and other bank-specific features.
Data Sources
Regional economic data from the EU"s Eurostat was collected using the NUT 9 8 The Hansen test and the second-order autocorrelation test results are reported in Table 4 and 5. 9 The NUTS Regulation lays down the minimum and maximum thresholds for the average size of the NUTS regions, with NUTS1 varying from 3 million to 7 million, NUTS2 from 800,000 to 3 million and NUTS3 from 150,000 to 800,000 (Eurostat, 2008) . Table 1 describes the variables and Table 2 reports the summary statistics. As shown in Table 2 , the logarithm of the Z-index varies from 0.72 to 8.32, with a mean value of 3.99. 10 Previous studies (Zimmerman, 1996; Meyers and Yeager, 2001; Yeager, 2004) tend to find little correlation between measures of economic conditions and bank performance when regions are defined in a narrower geographic scope such as counties in the US. Others find that state-level economic variables have a significant impact on bank performance (Nealy and Wheelock, 1997; Berger et al, 2000; Meyer and Yeager, 2001; Daly et al, 2008) . Calomiris and Mason (2000) find that both state and county economic indicators impacted bank survival rates in the US during the Great Depression. We define our regional variables at the NUTS1 level. The NUTS2 measures, however, are also included in robustness tests.
This is roughly in-line with that reported in Laeven and

Insert TABLES 1, 2 and 3 here 3. Results
In this section we present the results of our empirical analysis. First we discuss the empirical findings with respect to the relationship between competition and stability. We then outline the extent to which regional economic conditions affect bank stability and discuss briefly the impact of other bank-specific characteristics. Finally, we present the results of a number of robustness checks.
We estimate seven regressions to examine the impact of regional bank competition and economic conditions on bank stability. All regional indicators including the competition measure are at the NUTS1 level. 12 The results are summarized in Table 4 regression 2 adds the regional competition measure (but not the regional economic conditions measure) to regression 1. Regression 3 then uses the regional economic conditions measure, but excludes the regional competition measure. In regression 4, we include all regional competition, economic condition and bank-specific variables into the analysis. Regression 5 to 7 use the three components of the Z-index, namely ROA, KA and SDROA (three-year rolling window standard deviation of ROA) as dependent variables, respectively, to examine whether profitability, volatility of profits or capital strength determine any observed relationship between regional bank competition and stability.
Bank-specific covariates are included in all specifications.
We find significant coefficients of lagged Z-index across specifications, indicating that 12 We also run regressions using bank competition and economic conditions measures at NUTS2 level (see Table   5 for robustness test results).
bank stability appears to persist (to some extent) over time. In column 2 and 4 in Table 4 , the coefficient of regional competition is negative for the linear term but positive for the quadratic term
.Both coefficients are statistically significant. We further calculate the inflection point of the quadratic function and compare it with the distribution of the data. For example, in model 2, the inflection point is 11, which covers approximately 50% of the regional Lerner indices distribution. This implies a significant non-linear relationship between regional market competition and bank stability.
According to Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2009) , in highly concentrated banking markets where the regional Lerner index is high, the risk-shifting effect dominates. In this environment, when regional bank competition increases (regional Lerner indices decrease), banks are forced to charge lower loan rates and pay higher deposit rates (lower margins), reducing borrower costs and hence increasing bank stability (Z-index increases).
In a very competitive market, however, the so-called margin effect dominates where increased regional competition reduces loan interest re-payments and this reduces the size of the buffer covering loan losses thus increasing risk.
When the three components of the Z-index are examined, we find that regional bank competition has a significant negative (positive sign for Lerner indices) impact on ROA and its standard deviation, but not on the equity to assets ratio (KA). However, the non-linear relationship found between the regional Lerner indices and the Z-index does not exist between the components of the Z-index. The coefficients of both quadratic terms of regional market competition are insignificant when ROA and KA are examined.
Although the quadratic term is significant when SDROA is examined, the inflection point is 26.5, which is beyond the standard deviation of the ROA"s distribution.
We find evidence in Tables 4 that the regional unemployment rate (UNEMPR) has a significant negative impact on bank stability, indicating that those regions with high unemployment tend have less stable banks. Real GDP growth, however, does not enter the regressions significantly.
Large banks (LnTA) are found to have lower and less volatile profitability, although the combined effects cancelled out resulting in no impact on bank stability. In common with evidence presented for the US, diversification (DIV) is found to be negatively associated with the Z-index indicating that diversified banks tend to be more risky (Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh, 2010) . Cost inefficiency (CI) tends to lead to lower returns (ROA), but also lowers return volatility (SDROA), resulting in no impact on bank stability. Bank lending behavior (LA) is not found to have a significant impact on bank stability 13 . Both the coefficients of savings (dSAV) and cooperative bank (dCOOP) dummies are positive and significant. This is consistent with previous findings that both savings and cooperative banks (in general) tend to be safer than their commercial counterparts (Beck et al, 2009 ). These results are mainly driven by mutual banks having lower return volatility, albeit with lower profits.
Our results are further consistent with Beck et al (2009) who find that savings banks are safer than cooperative banks (see column 2 in Table 5 ). 14 
Sensitivity analyses of Competition and Stability
In Table 5 , we undertake a number of robustness tests. Hasan et al (2009) contend that allocating banks to regions on the basis of the location of the headquarters ignores the fact that some regions in Europe are financial centers of national or international relevance.
Including banks located in these centers may bias our results to some degree.
Consequently, in the first specification, we exclude banks located in these financial centers. 15 13 This perhaps is surprising as one would expect banks with higher loan-to-asset ratios to be more risky.
Unfortunately, we do not have access to detailed information on bank-specific loan composition which perhaps could inform us more about the nature of bank loan portfolios and risk. Since savings and cooperative banks tend to operate within their regions while their larger commercial counterparts tend to operate across regions in the second specification we exclude the commercial banks from the sample to address this potential bias.
Large regional banks tend to extend their businesses into adjacent regions in order to realize potential economies of scale or benefit from geographical diversification. Their presence in the sample may distort our results so we exclude the 10% and 20% largest banks (by assets size) in each region from the sample in the third and fourth specifications, respectively.
In specification six, we also use a 4-year rolling time window to calculate SDROA to arrive at our bank stability measure (Z-index) to check the sensitivity of our stability measure to time variation. Finally, in specification seven, we run regressions using bank competition and economic conditions measures calculated at the NUTS2 level.
As shown in Table 5 , our main results hold. That is, both the linear and quadratic terms of the regional Lerner index are significant in most cases, with a negative and positive sign, respectively. The inflection points range from 25% to 60% of the distribution of regional Lerner index, again confirming the non-linear relationship between bank competition and stability.
Conclusions
Competitive and economic conditions are likely to play a major role in determining the stability of banks. Previous empirical research has tended to assess any such relationships by using competition and macroeconomic variables computed at the national level. In this study we argue that such metrics are inappropriate for banks where the mode of competition and market served are likely to be organized at a regional level. This 
LERNERsquare
The square of LERNER real GDP growth (GDPG) Annual real growth rate of GDP at NUTS1 regional levels.
Unemployment rate (UNEMPR)
Annual unemployment rate at NUTS1 regional levels.
Bank size -log Total Assets (TA) The bank's total assets, as reported by Bankscope at original values.
Diversification (DIV)
The ratio of non-interest income over total operating income.
Loan to assets ratio (LA)
The ratio of total loans over total assets.
Cost to income ratio (CI)
The ratio of operating expenses over operating income Equity to assets ratio (KA) The ratio of bank equity to over total assets Return on assets (ROA) The ratio of bank net income after tax over total assets. 
